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Abstract
Since the beginning of the current millennium, Boko Haram has terrorised the residents of Northern Nigeria 
with devastating and high profile campaigns resuming in 2010. First responders struggle to cope with planning 
for and responding to the aftermath of these attacks. This paper describes analysis that can help emergency 
services pre-empt the geography and magnitude of susceptibility to attacks and the potential of the terrorists to 
generate severe attacks. The data used for the study were five years of terrorist activities. Results suggest that 
the efficiency of Boko Haram is not necessarily random and that attacks are generally well calculated to hit 
communities with disproportionate concentrations of vulnerable residents. The analysis is the first attempt to 
examine how a spatial segmentation framework might offer insight and intelligence towards understanding the 
configuration of terrorism for operational response.
Keywords: Nigeria; Insurgency; Terrorism; Boko Haram; Geodemographics, Spatial Analysis; Emergency 
Response.
Introduction
The global terrorism and counter-terrorism landscape have been transformed in a number of fundamental ways since the Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda launched coordinated attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. There is a noticeable spike in terror incidents driven by blurred 
lines of command and control (Tucker, 2008; Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010). Similarly, some of the 
motivations for terror remain politically vague. Others are characterised by various forms of religious or 
mystical impetus (Rausch, 2015). Additionally, terrorists have become highly skilled in the use of cyber-space 
and manipulative media platforms (Chuipka, 2016).
Whilst a lot of lessons have been learned about the origins, motivations and evolution of terrorist groups, 
new terror cell units continue to spring up (Englund and Stohl, 2016; Benedikter and Ouedraogo, 2017) 
and the foot soldiers of these groups are burgeoning. The capability of terrorist groups to recruit locally and 
across borders continues to present a challenge for efficient and effective counter-terrorism strategies. Several 
authors (Romagnoli, 2016; Falk, 2016; Gillombardo, 2016; Jenkins, 2017) agree that almost two decades since 
9/11, not only do the perpetrators still exhibit the intent and capability to launch similar attacks, they have 
succeeded in motivating the emergence of other groups operating in new geographical enclaves.
Since 2002, Boko Haram has operated primarily in the North East Geopolitical Zone of Nigeria, killing and 
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maiming thousands of innocent victims. The ideological orientation of Boko Haram is underpinned by Salafi 
jihadism which is based on a belief in “physical” jihadism and the Salafi movement of returning to what 
adherents believe to be true Sunni Islam (Cook, 2011).
In 2009, Boko Haram was violently suppressed by the Nigerian Army (Aghedo and Osumah, 2014) under 
the order of late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua. However, members of the terrorist organisation regrouped 
and re-surfaced in 2010 with high- profile attacks across the three geopolitical zones in Northern Nigeria. 
The global periscope focused on Boko Haram after the acclaimed kidnapping of 276 school girls from 
their dormitory in the town of Chibok in 2014 (Attah, 2016; Chiluwa and Ifukor, 2015). Some authors 
and stakeholders suggest that the 276 figure over-estimates the number of girls kidnapped from Chibok 
(Abubakar, 2015; Alter, 2015).
Since its re-emergence in 2010, Boko Haram has consistently featured amongst the deadliest terrorist 
organisations on the globe (Ligon et al., 2017). There are multiple dynamics which contribute towards 
shaping Nigeria’s socio-political landscape in ways that have facilitated the rise of a group like Boko Haram. 
Persisting inequalities have contributed towards the polarisation of Nigeria, creating a north-south socio-
economic divide. Northern Nigeria consistently lags behind the south on virtually all core development 
indices like educational attainment and social mobility (Cook, 2011; Aghedo and Osumah, 2014). There 
are many interlocking factors responsible for this yawning gap, ranging from political and leadership 
deficit to cultural and religious issues. Additional Nigerian dynamics which facilitate the rise of a group 
like Boko Haram include pervasive public sector corruption, recurring ethnic and sectarian conflicts, 
porous international borders, and a depleted intelligence and national security skeleton (Cook, 2011). These 
dynamics combine to erode national ambition and social capital and often result in disillusionment amongst 
the citizenry (Kieghe, 2016). Disillusioned population groups serve as easy prey for a group like Boko Haram 
which is constantly in search for potential recruits (Onuoha, 2014).
The remainder of this article details the examination of spatial structure and some contextual correlates of 
Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria from 2010 to 2015. A spatial segmentation framework is used to exhume 
patterns which may be operationally beneficial for first responders or the security personal combating the 
terrorists. This analysis makes a modest contribution towards a better understanding of the insurgency 
problem facing Northern Nigerians. Additionally, the methodological framework of the analysis has the 
potential to serve as a basis for intelligent forecasting of future attacks. 
Some Challenges Confronting Emergency Response Management in Nigeria
Nigeria’s emergency response framework mirrors the administrative geography of the country. The National 
Emergency Management Authority (NEMA) has lead responsibility for coordinating emergencies and 
disasters at the federal level (Fagbemi, 2011). Each of Nigeria’s 36 states have also been mandated by Nigeria’s 
central government to establish State Emergency Management Agencies (SEMAs) and Local Emergency 
Management Agencies (LEMAs) (NEMA, 2010). The core rationale behind this hierarchical structure is 
the need to avoid duplication of efforts. The three emergency management authorities are responsible for 
developing capabilities to prepare, prevent, respond to, and recover citizens from emergencies and disasters 
(NEMA, 2010). In addition to the three levels of emergency management authorities, the military, police and 
para-military forces are also key players within Nigeria’s emergency management system.
A range of multi-faceted factors contribute towards Nigeria’s challenges to readily and rapidly respond to the 
insurgency in the northern part of the country, particularly at the local level. Some of these factors include 
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military funding inadequacies (Ajayi and Nwogwugwu, 2014), incompatibility of emergency management 
structures at the local, state and federal levels of government (Pichette, 2015), weakness in data infrastructure 
and analytical competences (Pérouse de Montclos, 2016), inadequacy of public education mechanisms 
(Awofeso et al., 2003), lack of collaboration amongst relevant agencies (Agbiboa and Maiangwa, 2014) and 
corruption (Kieghe, 2016).
Nigeria comprises 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs). Due to inconsistent funding and technical 
weaknesses, Vulnerability and Capability Analysis (VCA) have only been implemented in 21 of these LGAs 
(Fagbemi, 2011). Furthermore, the refusal of some Nigerian states to comply with the directive of the federal 
government to establish SEMAs remains lamentable. Whilst the NEMA Act stipulates that NEMA should 
liaise with State Emergency Management Committees, to assess and monitor the distribution of relief 
materials to disaster victims, only 25 out of 36 states have functional SEMAs (Nnodim, 2016). Some of the 
states without functional SEMAs are situated in northern Nigeria where Boko Haram insurgency is currently 
concentrated.
Whilst a substantial number of scholarly contributions have been made towards aspects of the dynamics of 
the insurgency in the northern part of Nigeria, these have focused largely on theoretical and policy debates. 
There is significant paucity in the use of empirical techniques for understanding patterns and dimensions of 
the conflict for operational decision-making. Currently, NEMA and SEMA find it challenging to optimise 
the speed and volume of critical assistance delivery immediately after the onset of insurgency attacks. This 
is partly due to methodological constraints in systematically pre-empting where insurgents might strike and 
estimating the probable scale of humanitarian assistance that different types of communities might require 
(Valenti, 2015). Additionally, international humanitarian organisations have called for improvement in 
modelling and visualisation of at-risk communities. Christian Aid1 recommends the development of early 
warning and early response systems with predictive capabilities alongside training provision (Christian Aid, 
2016). It is believed that some methodological aspects of the research study summarised in this article may 
prove useful for such early warning response systems.
Potential of Utilising Spatial Segmentation Profiling for Emergency Response Preparedness 
Geographical Information Systems (GIS) add considerable context to spatial decision making. 
Geodemographic classifications are spatial segmentations that use multi-criteria and geo-statistical 
techniques to group places and people into clusters of similarity (Harris et al., 2005). There is a significant 
amount of interest in the development and adaptation of geodemographic problem-solving approaches 
across much of the developed world (Vickers and Rees, 2006; Willis et al., 2010; Kimura et al., 2011; Singleton 
and Spielman, 2014) with minimal application in developing countries (Ojo and Ezepue, 2011; Ojo et al., 
2012; Ojo et al., 2013).
Geodemographic modelling of the social, economic and demographic conditions of small areas within 
the framework of GIS has been used successfully for a wide range of human development sectors such as 
education and health (Brown, et al., 1999; Webber, 2005; Farr and Evans, 2005; Shelton et al., 2006, Abbas et 
al., 2009; Singleton, 2010; Singleton et al., 2012; Goodwin and Sykes, 2012; Sabater, 2015; Leventhal, 2016). 
Applications to the profiling of traditional criminogenic activities is also common (Ashby and Longley, 2005; 
Breetzke and Horn, 2009). However, the potential of geodemographic profiling remains under-exploited in 
studying insurgency and terrorism. It has been suggested that geodemographic segmentations may be used 
1  Christian Aid is a UK registered charity that provides urgent practical and effective assistance where need is great, tackling the effects of poverty as well as its root causes.
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to offer a strategic review of neighbourhoods and to identify potential terrorist cells (Ashby et al., 2008). 
To the best of our knowledge there is no evidence in academic and policy literature, of the application of 
geodemographic segmentation for profiling and mapping terrorism.
Geodemographic segmentations are generally developed by adapting clustering algorithms to relatively big 
multivariate spatial datasets (Ojo et al., 2012). This allows small areas to be grouped on the basis of their 
similarity in taxonomic space. A key reason for doing this is that there may be links identified with the 
classification of these small areas and other processes such as insurgency and terrorism. For example, spatial 
segmentations have been found useful in predicting educational behaviour (Brundson et al., 2011) as well as 
health dynamics (Kimura et al., 2011). In a similar vein, it is presumed that spatial segmentations could be 
used as a basis for identifying those community groups that may be more exposed to terrorists’ activities or 
where terrorist attacks are likely to yield disproportionately higher degrees of casualties. Such detailed level of 
insight can be particularly powerful for first responders.
Geodemographic segmentations serve as useful analytical tools for drilling down to local analytical scales of 
geography. This helps to eliminate bias in the geographical disbursement of national operational resources 
and responses to conflict and chaos zones. There is strong evidence of the potent power of social sorting 
tools for targeting and monitoring the impact of security interventions (Lyon, 2007). Additionally, spatial 
segmentations have been used by Regional, State and Local Authorities to drive national social marketing 
agendas (Powell, et al., 2007). This can be particularly useful when trying to educate local populations about 
the drivers of tensions in fragile communities.
Detailed pen-portraits of characteristics of local residents often accompany geodemographic segmentations. 
Therefore, linking terrorism data with spatial segmentation yields more powerful insight beyond pointing 
out the locations of these terror incidents. Such data linkage helps to elucidate (in qualitative terms) some of 
the information underlying complex quantitative detail. Due to their multivariate quality, geodemographic 
segmentations offer the opportunity to develop new hypothesis about dynamic activities (Abbas et al., 2009).
Although the availability of geodemographics is not yet widespread across Africa (Ojo and Ezepue, 2011), 
relevant statutory emergency response agencies in Nigeria can access an open-source geodemographic 
system (Ojo et al., 2012). Similarly, rapid global digital revolution has led to the development of several open-
source Geographical Information Systems (GIS) (Travis, 2015). These non-commercial software packages 
are freely accessible to first responders in Nigeria. However, these statutory agencies often lack the requisite 
methodological and technical know-how required to effectively utilise some of these systems (Ojo and 
Ezepue, 2011).
Datasets
Two datasets were used in synergy for the study reported in this article. The first is the Armed Conflict 
Location and Event Data (ACLED). The ACLED is one of the most comprehensive public collection 
of political violence and protest data for developing countries including Nigeria. The dataset contains 
variables which capture information on the specific dates and locations of political violence and protest, 
the types of event, the groups involved, fatalities, and changes in territorial control (Raleigh et al., 2010). 
Additional variables within the dataset record the battles, killings, riots, and recruitment activities of rebels, 
governments, militias, armed groups, protesters and civilians.
For the purpose of the analysis reported in this article, 1,664 unique terrorist events linked to Boko Haram 
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between 2010 and 2015 were extracted from the ACLED repository after consulting the relevant codebook 
(Raleigh and Dowd, 2017). The spatial distribution of the extracted data is shown Figure 1. A large number of 
terror strikes were concentrated in the North East Geopolitical Zone.
Figure 1: Distribution of Boko Haram Terror Incidents (2010 – 2015)
The second dataset – The Nigerian LGA Geodemographic Classification System (NIGECS) serves as 
the framework for capturing the contextual characteristics of the areal targets of the terrorists. The 
geodemographic segmentation encapsulates variables derived from the Nigerian Census and other national 
surveys (Ojo et al., 2012).
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Figure 2: Hierarchical Structure of the Nigerian Geodemographic Classification System
Almost 35,000 data points spread across 10 thematic domains were fused together using a multicriteria 
clustering procedure (Ojo et al., 2012; Ojo, 2010). The data domains include Agriculture, Demographics, 
Education, Employment, Health, Household Composition, Household Infrastructure, Housing, Socio-
economics and Women and Children. The clustering procedure generated six clusters called Super-groups. 
Two further hierarchies – Groups (23 clusters) and Sub-groups (57 clusters) were also created using the same 
clustering criterion. All 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Nigeria were assigned to a corresponding 
Super-group, Group and Sub-group cluster based on the prevailing characteristics of the resident population. 
Figure 2 shows the hierarchical structure of the entire system whilst Figure 3 showcases the spatial 
distribution of the geodemographic clusters at the Group level. It is noteworthy that three area types do not 
exist in northern Nigeria. These include Underprivileged Green Towns, Deprived Intermediate Territories 
and Customary Intermediate Territories.
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Figure 3: Geodemographic Segments of Northern Nigeria
Green Towns concentrate mostly in the South Western corner of Nigeria and can also be found in the North 
Central, South South, South East and North East Geopolitical Zones. Other variables such as desertification 
however affects the spatial spread of Green town concentration in the North East (Ojo, 2010). Unlike the 
southern geopolitical zones, these areas do not have huge spatial availability of Green towns due to the fast 
encroaching Saharan desert.
With large concentrations in the North West and pockets of the North East and North Central zones, 
Emerging Localities encapsulate 166 LGAs. While population density is below the national average (452 
persons per Km2), the mean household size of these areas is quite high at 6.1 persons.
A majority of Intermediate Territories can be found within the South East. They are also scattered across the 
South South and some areas of the North Central Geopolitical Zones. With a mean household size of 4.6 
persons, they make up 114 LGAs and have an above average mean population density of 709 persons per 
square kilometre (Ojo, 2010).
While Diluted Societies concentrate in the North Central Area of Nigeria, they can also be found in every 
other geopolitical zone. They make up 126 LGAs and have the highest mean household size of 5.4 persons. 
Their average population density is 643 persons per square kilometre.
Country Dwellings spread across the North East and North Western parts of Nigeria. They can also be found 
in the North Central Geopolitical Zone and they make up a total of 82 LGAs. These area types have a mean 
household size of 5.1 persons and an average population density of 144 persons per square kilometre.
With a mean household size of 4.6 persons and a very high population density of 5117 persons per 
square kilometre, Urban Nodes are scattered across the country and do not necessarily concentrate in any 
geopolitical zone. However, the North East has the lowest share of Urban Nodes (Ojo, 2010).
Operational Question and Methodology
The study reported in this article sought to arouse some possible hypotheses about the rationale for the 
patterns of Boko Haram attacks. More importantly, the analysis generates some explanations for the following 
prominent operational question which continues to puzzle first responders and similar law enforcement 
agencies in Nigeria’s northern region.
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Research Question: What is the spatial configuration and contextual descriptors of communities that are likely 
to suffer severe attacks and those that are expected to be susceptible to insurgency activities?
The theoretical foundation of this study is the rational choice theory (Cornish and Clarke, 1986). Terrorism 
is considered a type of crime, therefore it is assumed that the decision-making protocol of terrorists and 
criminals are generally similar (Clarke and Newman, 2006). Terrorist attacks are not random because the 
perpetrators have finite resources often deployed within the boundaries of a risk-reward calculus. In general, 
attacks are launched when the perceived reward exceeds the perceived risk (Pape, 2003). Conversely it is 
arguable that they can decide to launch attacks even though perceived risks outweigh rewards like attacking 
a fully functional military formation/barracks. This type of assault will make the news and project them 
as brave and daring. The fundamental conjecture is that terrorists consider the level of attractiveness of all 
potential targets before they strike. This implies that not all targets are equally eye-catching to terrorists. 
Secondly, terrorists do not have a monopoly of personnel and resources; therefore, they plan their attacks 
within the boundaries of these constraints.
There is an assumption that terrorists generally have a pre-determined level of carnage which they intend 
causing when they launch attacks (Jackson and Frelinger, 2009). The level of carnage will also vary from one 
location to another.
A total of 22,429 fatalities were recorded in the dataset harvested from the ACLED repository (Raleigh and 
Dowd, 2017). To model aggregated severity of attacks, all unique terrorist fatalities resulting from Boko 
Haram activities were geo-coded and linked to their corresponding geodemographic typologies. Two metrics 
were initially calculated – (1) the prevalence rate of fatalities (Aggregated fatalities per 100,000 inhabitants) 
and (2) the incidence rate (Aggregated fatalities per terrorist attack). Casualty Assessment Matrices 
(CAMs) were subsequently developed by comparing the two metrics. This was achieved by standardising 
the prevalence and incidence rates using an inter-decile range standardisation approach. This method is a 
slight variation of Wallace and Denham (1996) range standardisation method. The range standardisation 
is calculated by comparing the minimum and maximum values of a distribution. However, the inter-decile 
range standardisation is calculated by relating the median, tenth and ninetieth percentiles of a distribution as 
shown in the notation given in Equation 1.
 (1)
Where,
xi  is the value of the variable to be standardised
xmed  is the median of the distribution
x90th  is the 90th percentile
x10th  is the 10th percentile
For an area to be deemed highly susceptible, Boko Haram must be efficient in the deployment of their 
activities in the area. There is no general consensus as to the most appropriate measure of geographical 
susceptibility in terrorism analysis. This analysis considered a measure to ascertain the efficiency of Boko 
Haram. The hit rate is the proportion of terrorist attacks that successfully lead to at least one fatality in each 
geodemographic cluster (Bowers et al., 2004). This quantity varies with the frequency of attacks. Those LGAs 
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with higher frequency of incidents yield lower hit rates relative to their counterparts with fewer incidents. To 
mitigate this drawback, a weighted hit rate (WHR) measure is used. This allows the model to factor in the 
relative effect of the frequency of incidents. The WHR is given by the notation in Equation 2.   
 (2)
Where,
n is the number of incidents resulting in fatalities
N is the total number of incidents for the corresponding geodemographic typology
k is the total number of area typologies
P is the total population in each area typology
The efficiency of Boko Haram terrorists is gauged by the density of fatal incidents. The WHR is interpreted 
as the quotient between the efficiency rate of Boko Haram in each geodemographic typology and the relative 
likelihood for an attack to occur in that typology.
Severity and Susceptibility to Attacks
Results from the analysis of prevalence and incidence by geodemographic typologies are presented in Table 
1. Not all 23 geodemographic groups shown in Figure 2 were used because some area typologies cannot be 
found in the north of Nigeria. Therefore, sixteen group level typologies with reported fatalities were chosen. 
With regard to the results in Table 1, fatalities are excessively widespread within two types of groups – 
Struggling Green Towns and Toiling Country Dwelling.
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Struggling Green Towns are areas dominated by people in older age categories with high levels of population 
density. These areas are also more likely to have higher than average concentration of widowed and 
vulnerable population groups.
Toiling Country Dwellings are also disproportionately disadvantaged in terms of their likelihood of suffering 
huge numbers of casualty when Boko Haram strikes. In Northern Nigeria, Borno State has the largest 
number of LGAs categorised as Toiling Country Dwellings. There are average level representations of 
children. Single parent households are not much but there is an above average presence of separated couples 
(Ojo, 2010). Toiling Country Dwellings also exhibit the highest level of frequency of fatalities (incidence).
Incidence rates are also quite high within Disadvantaged Urban Nodes. These are areas with an above average 
representation of people aged between 15 and 59 years. Unmarried persons are substantially representative 
within these areas. Households with at least one pensioner are also disproportionately high. It is also not 
uncommon to find households of over 5 residents (Ojo, 2010).
The significantly high prevalence rates of fatality suffered by residents of Struggling Green Towns and 
Toiling Country Dwellings is somewhat linked to the repeated volume of attacks experienced in these areas. 
Together, both geodemographic clusters account for a third of all attacks. However, one of the highlights of 
the analysis is that it exposes high fatality rates (44 fatalities per 100,000 people) within Prosperous Urban 
Nodes where the frequency of attacks is quite low. The findings suggest well-calculated attacks in areas with 
disproportionately high representations of unmarried middle aged persons. Large numbers of pensioner 
households and single parents can also be found in these areas.
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Figure 4: Casualty Assessment Matrix
The Casualty Assessment Matrix (CAM) is essentially a scatter plot of the standardised prevalence and 
incidence rates. Results are shown in Figure 4. For the assessment of severity, both prevalence and incidence 
rates are considered equally important. Therefore, neither was prioritised over the other. Prevalence is 
descriptive, often demonstrating need. On the other hand, incidence is useful for studying the underlying 
causes or examining the order in which events occur. Those geodemographic groups with higher than 
average levels of both prevalence and incidence of fatalities are designated catastrophic in terms of the 
expected levels of severity of the situation. Areas where the levels of severity are expected to be major are 
characterised by high prevalence with low incidence or low prevalence with high incidence. Moderate levels 
of severity combine low prevalence with low incidence rates.
Figure 5: Potential to Generate Catastrophic, Major and Moderate Attacks
On the basis of outputs from the analysis, Figure 5 highlights those areas where insurgents have the potential 
to generate catastrophic, major or moderate levels of severity when they attack. These spatial divisions are an 
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extrapolation of the CAM analysis of the geodemographic groups. The map demonstrates the usefulness of 
this approach for emergency response planning for instance, in a fragile security zone. By highlighting those 
areas with a high predisposition for fatalities, the results could assist both policy and sensitisation efforts in 
these areas. Results show that Toiling Country Dwellings exhibit traits that make these area types the most 
vulnerable to catastrophic levels of severity.
Figure 6: Geography and Magnitude of Susceptibility to Boko Haram Attacks
Figure 6 shows a heat map of the quotient between the efficiency rate of Boko Haram in each 
geodemographic typology and the relative likelihood for an attack to occur in that typology. The 
susceptibility modelling results suggest that areas that are highly susceptible to Boko Haram attacks are 
characterised by people in older age categories. Though households of 1 to 2 persons are very common, the 
population density in such areas are much higher than average. Again, these areas have a large concentration 
of widowed population groups. The findings from this analysis suggest that these types of communities 
(Struggling Green Towns), which includes the capital of Borno State, are 8 times more susceptible to Boko 
Haram activities. Toiling Country Dwellings which are next in the queue in terms of susceptibility are only 
twice as vulnerable. These areas exhibit literacy rates that are below the national average with high incidence 
of uneducated household heads. General access to primary school is low and there are low rates of secondary 
school completion. Our results reveal marked inequalities in terms of susceptibility to attacks.
Some Implications for Security Evaluation and Emergency Response
The authors clarify how the spatial patterns illustrated may be used by local, state, and federal emergency 
response agencies to effectively respond to Boko Haram attacks. The arguments are generally hermeneutic 
since the research findings should be construed in light of additional knowledge in the agencies which lie 
outside the scope of the paper.
The focus of the security and emergency response agencies should be to combine the evidence base detailed 
in this paper with additional covert information for the purpose of smarter decision-making. The weighted 
hit rate of the attacks modelled in Equation 2, intuitively provides a comparative measure of the relative 
expected levels of fatalities across different communities, normed by prevalence rates and base populations. 
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This information and related measures are conveyed visually in figures 1-6 in the paper. The results show how 
terrorist activities are differentially spatially concentrated in different Northern states, with higher activities 
in Yobe, Borno, Kano, Gombe, Bauchi, and North Eastern Adamawa states, compared to the sparsely-
distributed occurrences in North Western states (Kebbi and Sokoto) and North Central states (Niger, Taraba, 
Kaduna), and the Abuja FCT. It seems that the closeness to Sokoto, which is the seat of the Islamic Caliphate 
in Northern Nigeria (Enwerem, 1995) may be associated with less intensity, possibly complete absence 
of the attacks in these geographic areas, compared to the North-Eastern states. This insight requires an 
understanding of the differences in containment strategies in the different states and geo-political regions, 
and importantly the impact of different Muslim sects on the patterns and severities of attacks.
Results from this analysis further suggest that attacks in major cities like Kano, Kaduna, and Abuja may be 
connected to a strategy of causing more visible impacts on the part of the terrorists. These insights again need 
to inform the nature of emergency response especially at the federal level.
Overall, the evidence base should be used to strengthen the awareness of the importance of geodemographic 
analysis in security analysis and responses on the parts of the local, state and federal emergency response 
agencies. Again, the insights need to be combined with what is already known by these agencies regarding 
the case stories of victims and their families, and how their experiences differ by their socio-economic 
backgrounds.
Conclusion
Sadly, coping with increased terrorist activities and threats have become a part of the daily lives of Northern 
Nigerian. Whilst public safety and increased policing and military presence is paramount, it is integral for the 
decision-making process of armed forces and emergency service providers to be underpinned by properly 
scrutinised evidence. The overwhelming response of the Nigerian governments has been to increase security 
in public spaces – and rightfully so. However, the analyses reported in this paper indicate that the terrorists 
are quite meticulous. Zones of susceptibility and severity of attacks correlate with the presence of vulnerable 
residents. The combination of a geodemographic framework with open data on terrorist activities helps to 
organise security analysis for first responders. Furthermore, results from this analysis can be used to facilitate 
information sharing and integration during emergency preparation and response. Arguably, this can help 
to stimulate better communication, increased situational awareness and analysis including agile decision 
making for more effective risk management and emergency response by statutory emergency response 
agencies.
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